[MUSIC] >> Now, I want to talk a little bit about two very important areas. They're not necessarily related to Chinese foreign policy, but they clearly are related to Chinese policy towards areas outside of the mainland. And this would be Chinese mainland policy and mainland ties with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Now, what we find here is a similar pattern in both societies in response to increased Chinese assertiveness. What we see is really resentment within the society as the business elite within those societies benefit from these close economic ties with the rising China. But ordinary citizens feel a threat to their freedoms. They see increased housing costs, they find rude tourists, their salaries don't go up much. They feel that their jobs are threatened by an influx of very talented people from the mainland, and they also worry about the growing influence of mainland newspapers on the local media. Now, in many ways this is ironic because China wants to incorporate these areas into China. And so, it's reaching out. But what you find is that the more that China, mainland China, and Chinese get closer ties with these two districts, these two areas, that, in fact, local identity in these two areas gets strengthened. Also, Taiwan watches the evolution of what's called one country, two systems, a formula proposed by China to manage the incorporation of Taiwan in to China. Now, if we look at the problems that have emerged more recently in the Taiwan-Mainland relations, between 2000 and 2008, Chen Shui-bian became the first president of Taiwan from the Democratic Progressive party, which favors independence. And he constantly used every opportunity to distance Taiwan from China. In response, China passed the Anti-Secessionist Law in 2005, which formalized PRC policy, China's policy to use non-peaceful means if Taiwan declared independence. So, that was rather threatening. On the other hand, Hu Jintao was very patient on Taiwan. He invited DPP officials to China. He promised the former Taiwanese Prime Minister, who visited him, that policy would not change under Se Jin Ping. And, in fact, what we saw was after Mai In Jo, who was the Chairman of the Nationalist Party, the Guamindung, became Taiwanese President in May 2008, a whole new group host of agreements were signed which helped economically link the two regions. Nevertheless, when we look at the question of identity, what we can see is that here running from 1992 all the way to 2014 til, June 2014, this slide, then, shows self-identity, how Taiwanese saw themselves. And the key identities, really, are whether they saw themselves as Taiwanese, as both Taiwanese and Chinese, as Chinese and then, no response. And you can see that, back in 1992, at least 25% of people in Taiwan felt that they were Chinese. But that percentage drops dramatically down to close to zero, and the number of people who feel that they are Taiwanese and, Taiwanese and Chinese both, increases dramatically. And, particularly, you can see here that in 1992 only 17% of people in Taiwan said that they were first and foremost Taiwanese. But by 2014 it had gone way up to over 60%. So, this really creates an important problem, or a major problem, for the mainland in terms for China, in terms of being able to win over the people of Taiwan to have a closer relationship with the mainland. Economically, the relationship has become very, very close, and Taiwanese businesses have moved onto the mainland with perhaps 1 million Taiwanese living and working on the mainland. China's tried to use this economic leverage to influence elections in Taiwan by mobilizing Taiwanese who are working in China to go back and vote for the KMT, for the nationalists. But Taiwanese, in terms of the political economy, even though they're manufacturing a lot of products in the mainland, they are careful not to move the final stages of some of their most high tech goods on to the mainland because they're afraid that that technology will be stolen. Nevertheless, by 2014 there were 2,300 new, or 2,300 Taiwanese businesses on the mainland with a total investment of $2.02 billion. Now, the current status is not as optimistic as it was during the period when Ma Ying-jeou was the President. He tried to push a new trade agreement in 2013, and the young people got very upset. They occupied the Parliament, the legislative Yuan, in what's now known as the Sunflower Movement, and they forced President Ma to shelve the bill. Now, again, surveys would show that 80% of Taiwanese would favor independence if China would not attack. And, amazingly, even 40%, so, half of those, would still favor independence even at the risk of the mainland attacking. Now, in 2015, there was this historic meeting in Singapore between Ma, between President Ma and Xi Jinping. But by that time Ma was just about to resign, and it really seemed to be what I would call too little too late. And we know that China reacts forcefully whenever Taiwan moves away from reunification. And now that the DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party, has again elected a president, Tsai Ing-wen, and now even more controls for the first time, the legislative Yuan, we can anticipate that there could be various serious problems across the Taiwan Strait. Now, Hong Kong is also a problem, even though it's the test point of one country, two systems, where Deng Xiaoping decided to allow Hong Kong to exist under this idea of one country, two systems, where Hong Kong kept it's legal, economic and political system for 50 years. And this was promised to the people of Hong Kong, promised to the British in the joint declaration on Hong Kong, which was registered as an international treaty at the United Nations. But the problem comes because Hong Kong people tend to emphasize two systems, the fact that Hong Kong is different than the mainland, while Beijing really pushes for one country and it's influence should be greater. Now, Hong Kong people increasingly, just like the people in Taiwan, see themselves as Hong Konger's more than seeing themselves as Chinese. And this is particularly true for people under 30, as 88% see themselves as either Hong Konger's, 55% of the people do that, and Hong Kong Chinese, 33% have that attitude. So, here we have, right, a similar kind of figure as I showed you for Taiwan. And, here again, as we go back February 1993 up until January of 2014, the two things you want to pay attention to are, one, the extent to which Hong Kong people feel that they are Chinese versus the extent to which Hong Kong people feel that they are Hong Kongers. Now, it's important to remind you that in 1997, right at this point here, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty. So, China took over Hong Kong again. And so, you can see here in this period, the attitude of being Chinese was pretty good. People felt, Hong Kongers felt, pretty Chinese even though they still felt that they were still Hong Kongers. But then, it sort of stays stable for a long time, and then in the last few years, we can see that the attitude toward being Chinese dropped off dramatically, peaked a little bit, and then came crashing back down here while the number of people who feel, or the percentage of people that feel, either being Hong Kong or Chinese Hong Kongers actually goes up dramatically. So, the same kind of identity problem really exists in Hong Kong as well. Now, the mainland has tried to introduce some laws, and tried to introduce, make Hong Kong somewhat more like the mainland, or at least integrate it more into China. And one of the things they did was they tried to introduce a tougher national security law in 2003, and that triggered massive protests. Half a million people, about 7% of the population, and then the following year, another 350 thousand people came out, about 5% of the population, as Hong Kong people felt that the law would take away their freedoms. And, again, the law was never introduced. Then, in 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce what we call national education with courses on China, which Hong Kong youth saw as brainwashing. And immediately on the announcement, 90,000 people protested. There was a big sit-in at the office of the chief executive, who was the governing leader of Hong Kong. And, again, he was forced to suspend the policy. But the youth that emerged in that 2012 campaign then became the leaders of the 2014 campaign, where there emerged what's called the umbrella movement, led by these young people. And their big goal was to have open nominations for a full democratic election for Hong Kong's chief executive. Now, it's very important to remember that, in 2007, the central government, the government in Beijing, promised, and it seemed to be quite willing to have, an open election, free, everybody in Hong Kong would have the right to vote for the new chief executive. But the umbrella movement, which was led by these young people, wanted to have an open nomination system for this election while the government in Beijing wanted to have veto power over the candidates.