[MUSIC] Conclusion, a nice word. Summary, whatever but this is actually a conclusion both to today's discussion about this week's discussion about China's future, and also a conclusion to part one of my course on Chinese politics. I hope that you enjoyed it and learnt a lot. I've certainly enjoyed putting it together for you. Now in conclusion, today's lecture though, we really have to talk about some of the short-term challenges that Xi faces to his reforms. This reform is very important to China's future. But as Xi tried to reform the important parts of the system, which he believes increases the CCP's survivability, he is currently meeting major challenges. For example, in August 21st, 2015, after the annual party meeting at Beihdaihe, a resort on Hubei province on the coast of Eastern China, the Peoples' Daily reported quite amazingly, that Xi's reforms were meeting, quote, unimaginably fierce resistance. The next day the People's Daily warned that officials who did not get behind the reform effort would get demoted. So clearly Xi is running into a lot of resistance and did not get necessarily the support that he wanted at Beidahe in that meeting. When that big parade took place in China to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Xi announce that he would retire a large number, about 300,000 members, of the armed forces, of whom 170,000 are land-based lieutenants, ranking to senior colonels and that this would be done to promote reform of the PLA. Now as I mentioned before, my own view is that there is a concern about reform even though, this lack of reform may increase the risk. So particularly political reforms, Xi Jinping strongly resists this inner party democracy and political reform and any role for society and politics. But within the party I'm sure that there are great concerns about if you don't move forward on political reform, where do you go? All right? Now, the concerns are understandable within the party because we've seen non-governmental organizations becoming quite active, China looks outward and they see the colored revolutions of 2005, they see the Arab Spring in North Africa and all the chaos, and then Syria, all the chaos that this has created. And China is convinced, in fact, that external forces want to subvert China and the CCP in order to stop its rise. Yet China has been able to resist these international pressures for political reform and democratization, and withstand even the economic crises that have been coming in from overseas. So in my own view, the likelihood of any kind of significant political reform in the near future is quite small. But the CCP must resolve the land confiscation problems, and the environmental problems, two of the key, the primary sources of social unrest. Doing so would significantly decrease the number of protests in the society. And an enhanced role of the rule of law will clearly help in this. If the anti-corruption drive also succeeds and the economy recovers from the current downturn, I believe that the regime may last a long time, using albeit a coercive, a more coercive form, or a relatively coercive form of market Leninism. These are clearly Xi Jinping strategy and his target. Still, while some western observers believe that China and the CCP are in deep trouble, we will really know much more about China's future after the 19th Party Congress in 2017. At that time, Xi may strengthen his own leadership team, bringing in people that will follow his direction much more effectively than people that he's got around him now. And this may allow him to push through much of his bold reform program. Now, as you go back and think about this class, I would encourage you to think about, what do you see? Now that you've heard this lecture, what do you think is the most likely scenario for China's future and why?