[MUSIC] We want to take a more careful look at the first of the three problemata in Fear and Trembling, which raises the question in its title, is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? Let's begin by having a look at the text to see what's meant by this. The chapter begins with a contrast between the universal and the single individual. By universal here, Kierkegaard means the sphere of generally accepted ethics and ways of behaving. He refers explicitly to a section in Hegel's book, The Philosophy of Right, which is a work on ethics and political philosophy that was published in 1821. We saw earlier, that Hegel is interested in exploring what he called, the ethical life of a people, for example, the ancient Greeks. This was a large sphere of interconnected elements of the public social order, for example, ethics, law, traditional customs, religious practices, and so forth. This conception of ethics, is what Kierkegaard associates with the universal. It's universal, since it's something that everyone knows and everyone participates in intuitively. According to this view, we know what our ethical duties are, simply by looking at what the traditions and customs of our society tell us. In this sense, ethics is by definition, what established custom dictates. For someone who defends this view, the great sin is to act in contradiction to the universally accepted ethics. When one acts for one's own selfish interest and disregards the universal duties that bind one, then, one acts unethically. So, for example, both law and accepted ethics say that I should not steal. But I might be so focused on my own personal needs and interests and money, so that I'm inclined to do so anyway. In this case, I put my personal desires above the universal. I act both illegally and immorally. This part seems entirely uncontroversial. But Kierkegaard brings in an example that makes this picture considerably more complex. He tries to understand the meaning and implications of the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis chapter 22. We all know the story. Isaac is Abraham's only son, who is apparently destined to be the next great patriarch to lead the people. But God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son on Mount Moriah. Needless to say, this was presumably very vexing for Abraham since, this meant not only killing his beloved son, but also ending his family line. But Abraham obeys God and takes Isaac with him to Mount Moriah, where he prepares everything for the sacrifice. Then, at the crucial moment, when it's time for him actually to sacrifice Isaac, an angel appears and stops him, and provides him with a Ram to sacrifice instead. Kierkegaard points out that this story raises puzzling questions for the conception of ethics that we just discussed. According to the universal ethics, it's wrong and illegal to murder someone, not to mention for fathers to kill their own sons. So Abraham is acting in a way that's ethically wrong when seen from this perspective. It's as if, he is an individual is overriding the universal ethics of the community. This is what Kierkegaard means by the phrase, the suspension of the ethical. In other words, Abraham has received a revelation from God that requires him to put aside, in this one instance, the universal rules and practices and traditions that govern the ethics of his people. In order to fulfill God's command, Abraham must suspend ethics, and act, as it were, on the basis of something higher than this. He calls this a Teleological Suspension, since ethics are suspended for a higher telos, or end. Our intuitions seem, in a sense, to be split here, since, on the one hand, we want to say along with Hegel, that it's wrong to kill innocents and there's nothing higher than this universal. But then on the other hand, we also want to say that one should obey the command of God. But what if these two are in contradiction with one another as they are here, which is the correct course of action to take? Kierkegaard points out that, on Hegel's point of view, we would have to regard Abraham as a murderer or perhaps more accurately almost a murderer. But there seems to be something not quite right about this, since we want to regard Abraham as a faithful and pious man who's merely obeying the will of God. But according to the view of universal ethics, there's nothing higher than the universal and thus the idea of a divine revelation being a reason to suspend the ethical can't really be recognized. This is the key interpretive point in the text. At first glance it looks as if Kierkegaard, via his pseudonymous author, straightforwardly wants to defend the view that there can be a suspension of the ethical in cases like this. It looks as if, he wants to criticize the universal view of ethics as being too narrow, since it fails to take into account exceptions to the rules. In a certain sense, it seems that he does want to say this, but the critical point is how he does so. The key here is that, he doesn't argue for this discursively. He doesn't try to enumerate reasons for why Abraham is justified in doing what he's doing. On the contrary, he says flatly that this can't be done. The third problema is dedicated to an analysis of Abraham's silence and Kierkegaard claims that it's essential that Abraham keeps silent about the motivations for his action. It would be wrong if he were to try to convince people that he was acting justly, since he was merely fulfilling God's command which he had received in a revelation. He can't attempt to make arguments of this kind, since it all boils down to a matter of faith. And faith is something private. Faith is about the single individual. But language consists of universals. So if Abraham were to try to articulate his faith verbally, he would inevitably end up describing it with universals. His description would thus be a hopeless distortion of what he actually wants to express. Abraham can't convey to anyone else his own private faith. This is something that's non discursive and ineffable. Any attempt to explain it or use it as a justification for his actions, would be a distortion of it. Thus, Abraham would simply carry out the action and keep silent about it. He knows full well, that he must accept the consequences of it if he were to be caught and persecuted legally. He knows that he can't use faith or his revelation as any kind of defense. The point that Kierkegaard seems to want to draw from his analysis in Fear and Trembling is less about ethics or political philosophy and more about religious faith. Indeed, throughout the work, he talks about a night of faith, which is clearly modeled on Abraham. Although the story of Abraham and Issac is of course, one that belongs to Judaism in the Old Testament, scholars have generally taken Abraham's obedience to God, also to be a model for Christian faith. Indeed, a model that Kierkegaard seems to want to recommend. So, what does Kierkegaard say about faith in this context? In a famous line he writes, faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal. This is a sentence that scholars have argued about extensively. Kierkegaard's point seems to be that there are instances like that of Abraham, where the individual takes precedence over accepted customs in universal ethics. Or, put differently, not all actions that are done based on one's own individuality, or at the expense of the universal ethics should be summarily dismissed as something that's evil. The key thing to note is the way in which Kierkegaard puts this point. As we know, Christian apologetics is the branch of theology that attempts to defend the Doctrines of Christianity. It tries to offer arguments and good reasons for believing in things such as the incarnation, the ascension, the virgin birth and so forth. The goal of Christian apologetics is to convince skeptics, or non-believers of the truth of the Christian faith. But note that Kierkegaard's approach is entirely different from this. As we see, he's trying to articulate the nature of Christian faith. Traditional Christian apologists would try to give good reasons and arguments for why faith is rational and well grounded. They would try to make a positive case for Christian faith, but Kierkegaard does just the opposite. He says not that faith is reasonable or comprehensible, but rather that it's a paradox that can't be grasped discursively. He says that Abraham acts by virtue of the absurd, this can hardly be taken as a recommendation for faith or as a convincing argument against a skeptic of Christianity. If a skeptic were to demand a solid reason for thinking that Abraham received a revelation from God, and our response was that Abraham believed by virtue of the absurd, this would not go very far to convince anyone. To say that something is absurd is usually to discount it. It's not a positive argument for a position. Understanding faith as a paradox can be seen as what's been called a negative concept, that is a concept that doesn't have concrete positive content but rather leaves things open. By proposing the concept of faith as a paradox, Kierkegaard doesn't really solve definitively the problem about faith, but rather he problematizes the issue and in effect, invites us, his readers, to continue to explore it on our own. Here we can see the spirit of Socrates once again in Kierkegaard's texts. Socrates claims to be ignorant, and therefore, he doesn't present any positive doctrine. Instead, he merely criticizes the views of others and reduces them to contradiction and absurdity. In a sense, Kierkegaard is doing the same thing here. He claims that faith is not something positive or concrete, but rather, it's a paradox, a contradiction. Like Socrates' approach, this is negative. Nothing is really resolved, but rather the problem is left open as a problem. I'm joined again by Professor Heiko Schulz on the faculty of theology at the Johann Wolfgang von Goethe University in Frankfurt in Germany. Professor Schulz, Kierkegaard is often referred to as a thinker of passion. In your opinion, what does this mean? How's Kierkegaard's view of passion relevant for us today in the modern world? Some people might argue that with school shootings and other forms of modern violence that there's all too much passion. Do you think Kierkegaard's right when he says that what we need is more passion? Some people might argue to the contrary that what we need is less. >> Good question. Well, first of all, the title, Kierkegaard as a thinker of passion, is a complex one. It seems to me, that we have to distinguish between at least four senses, or four respects and in which Kierkegaard can be talked about as a thinker of passion. First, he was obviously a passionate person himself, and in that sense he was a thinker of passion. He was passionate. But secondly, his passion is basic passion found expression in his thinking. So thinking was a passion of himself, and not everybody has the same or shares the same passions. His passion was thinking. And again, this passion for thinking found expression in thinking about passion itself. So, that's a third sense which seems to be crucial here. And finally, he did not simply have the passion of thinking about passion, but he had the passion of thinking about the passion of thinking. So he was of the opinion that thinking itself is a form of passion. And in this fourfold sense I think, we have to talk about Kierkegaard as a thinker of passion. Now is that relevant for our times? Kierkegaard's own diagnosis in one of the journal notes. That our time of 19th century, already, is not so much a time or a society of evil individuals, but of wretched individuals in the sense that these individuals lack passion. And at first sight, it would seem that nowadays this diagnosis does not obtain anymore, because we have school shootings and other things and we think there's too much passion going on. Wouldn't it be necessary to cool down and have a bit more of intellectual reflection and stuff like that? It seems to me Kierkegaard's basic diagnosis is that our times are qualified by, not so much by passionate acting, but by lack of passion, or by wretchedness, what he calls wretchedness. And if we think of school shootings, and if we think of a lot of violence in our times, it seems to be that his diagnosis is anachronistic to a certain extent. But, I don't think it is. I would make a distinction between reflected and unreflected passion. And thinking about books like Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, it seems to me this seems to be a valid distinction. Kierkegaard puts high requirements on Abraham, as the one who's going to sacrifice his own son. And Kierkegaard says, it's only legitimate to act like Socrates did, by fulfilling those very strict requirements. Of course, what Abraham is about to do, is a very passionate act. He's going to sacrifice his own son. And Kierkegaard says, it's possible that this act is legitimate, is a teleological suspension of the ethical. At least if two requirements are fulfilled. And the first, you have to love whom you sacrifice, whom you're about to sacrifice. And secondly, the possible purpose for a greater community like, say, the society, or a state, or whatever, can't be there. If there's any kind of possibility of transforming my act, and the purpose of my act into such a greater community, then it can't be a legitimate case of a teleological suspension of the ethical. So in that sense, you could say somebody who commits a school shooting or anything like that, wouldn't in all probability, wouldn't fulfill these requirements. And therefore, it couldn't be a reflected form of passion, but an unreflected form of passion, and in that sense illegitimate. And so what you could say, still the diagnosis holds. Most people, or a lot of people, are lacking in passion, on the one hand. And on the other hand, we find a lot of people who have passion but just have the wrong form of passion, namely unreflected passion. Readers of Kierkegaard today are often perplexed and even confused that his theory of faith is a contradiction or a paradox. Does Kierkegaard really have a point with this, or does he just like to provoke and confuse people? How is this somewhat odd theory of faith relevant for us in the modern world today? At bottom, the key issue in Fear and Trembling is the relation of religious faith to the secular world with its laws, customs and traditions. Abraham is a great model of piety and religious faith. But his actions potentially lead into conflict with the laws of his people. One might think that this is just an old story that has no relevance today since no one would think of making human sacrifices today. But when one considers the matter further, one quickly realizes then in fact this is a central and unresolved issue in our own day. Most countries here in Europe, and in the West, ensure the religious freedom of their citizens. This is a part of the western heritage from the enlightenment and the basic freedom to believe what one wishes is enshrined in the constitutions of the laws of the state. The spirit of these laws is clearly to ensure that each individual has the right to pursue their religious practice without harassment or impediment regardless of how unpopular those practices might be, but things are not always so simple. What countries say that they believe in religious freedom and have laws protecting it, there are limits to this. Specifically, the limits to religious freedom appear the moment that religious practices come into conflict with civil law. If my religion dictated that I, for example, murder people as human sacrifices, then the state could not allow this. There are, of course, less dramatic examples of this conflict in cases where, for example, religion requires its followers to take certain hallucinogenic drugs in connection with their religious rites. But these substances are illegal in some places. Or some religions sanction polygamy, which is illegal in the eyes of the state. Examples of this kind seem to imply that while religious freedom is a basic right, it's not unlimited. Whether it must be exercised in a way that's consistent with civil law. Kierkegaard's view, or that of his pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio raises difficult problems for this picture. This difficult claim is that there can be cases where the individual is higher than the universal. Well, there can be a suspension of the generally accepted ethical and legal norms of the state and society. God's demand that Abraham sacrifice his beloved son is the prime example of this. One might say that Kierkegaard's clear implication here is that Abraham's action to sacrifice his son is not only okay, but even praiseworthy from a religious perspective. According to this view, Kierkegaard's message is that when one has a firm religious conviction, or when one receives a revelation from God to do something, then it's an absolute command that trumps ethics and civil law. One must simply follow this obediently. But doesn't this view lead to dangerous consequences? One often hears of criminals, for example, murderers who in their defense claim that God told them to do what they did. Likewise, many forms of terrorism are grounded in the deep seated religious belief. Many terrorists also believe that they are fulfilling the will of God with their actions. Most of us are disinclined to accept this as a reason for the murder of innocent people. But does Kierkegaard's analysis of Abraham open the door for this kind of thing. If he were alive today would Kierkegaard defend the action of terrorists as great acts of piety? I don't think so. If we look closer we can see that there are important elements in Kierkegaard's analysis that separate him from the modern murderer or terrorist. Perhaps, most importantly, Kierkegaard emphasizes the paradoxical nature of faith. It's something that is contradictory and absurd. Moreover, faith is something entirely inward. And can't be communicated directly to another person. For this reason, Abraham remains silent. This is an important point. The modern murderer or terrorist is inclined to use the religious motivation of their action as an argument in defense of it. In other words, the murderer says that God told him to kill someone. And the point of this is to explain the action and to defend it. But Kierkegaard's point is that this is a misunderstanding. One can never use the idea that one received of revelation from God, and is acting on God's will as a defense for one's actions. It's true that one might believe this in the quiet of one's own mind, or as Kierkegaard says, in one's inwardness. But the moment one tries to communicate it, one shows that one has really not understand the nature of faith. He claims that faith is not objective and discursive, not communicable in his way. This is a fundamental difference between Kierkegaard's view and that of the modern murderer or terrorist who seeks to explain, justify and defend their actions based on reasons, arguments, and discursive communication. So while it might look at face value as if Kierkegaard is offering a theory that might justify illegal and immoral acts and atrocities, a closer look shows that this is not the case. No justification can be sought from the side of religious faith. All of this raises important and very topical issues about the limits of religious freedom. Where exactly is the line where religious freedom stops and civil law begins? Can or should civil law make certain exceptions to accommodate certain religious practices or should it lay down a certain consistent position that everyone in society is obliged to follow? Is religious faith compromised or convoluted if it's obliged to bend to the rules of mainstream society? Does civil law discriminate against certain minority religions in society? These are all very important issues in our own day. It's just a great mistake to believe that the question of religious freedom was resolved with the enlightenment. Instead, with the granting of religious freedom, a new set of issues and problems were ushered in. [SOUND]
