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Office Hours 4

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Buddhism and Modern Psychology

Princeton University

4.8 (3,218 ratings) | 300K Students Enrolled

The Dalai Lama has said that Buddhism and science are deeply compatible and has encouraged Western scholars to critically examine both the meditative practice and Buddhist ideas about the human mind. A number of scientists and philosophers have taken up this challenge. There have been brain scans of meditators and philosophical examinations of Buddhist doctrines. There have even been discussions of Darwin and the Buddha: Do early Buddhist descriptions of the mind, and of the human condition, make particular sense in light of evolutionary psychology? This course will examine how Buddhism is faring under this scrutiny. Are neuroscientists starting to understand how meditation “works”? Would such an understanding validate meditation—or might physical explanations of meditation undermine the spiritual significance attributed to it? And how are some of the basic Buddhist claims about the human mind holding up? We’ll pay special attention to some highly counterintuitive doctrines: that the self doesn’t exist, and that much of perceived reality is in some sense illusory. Do these claims, radical as they sound, make a certain kind of sense in light of modern psychology? And what are the implications of all this for how we should live our lives? Can meditation make us not just happier, but better people? All the features of this course are available for free. It does not offer a certificate upon completion.

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Skills You'll Learn

Philosophy, Psychology, Mindfulness, Meditation

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IP

Dec 23, 2018

This is a great effort which should be appreciated. Just because at a time like this, some are curious to know about the Buddhism, & with the psychological background, which adds more value for this.

AS

Feb 08, 2018

Acquired huge amounts of insight from this course and enjoyed reading the various perspectives when marking papers in the peer marked assessments. Thank you for providing such a wonderful course!

Aus der Unterrichtseinheit

A New Model of the Mind

Office Hours 433:56

Unterrichtet von

Robert Wright
Visiting Lecturer

Skript

hello.

Welcome to Office Hours.

I wanted to start by answering a question that's on

everyone's mind, which is, are the dogs in the office?

This week, they are, as it happens.

My wife is out of town.

They really prefer to be in with her, but when she's gone, they'll settle for me.

That's Frasier in the chair.

He's gotten his spring haircut.

So, he's looking a little,

little more doggy I think.

A little doggier than when he's fluffier.

And then there is.

Where's Milo?

Hello, Milo.

How are you doing, buddy?

He seems happy.

Okay, the dogs are actually not totally unrelated to one

of the questions we got in Office Hours this week.

You know we talked about the modular theory of

the mind, the modular model of the mind, this week.

And one of the questions was asked by Carston Qvist, Q-V-I-S-T.

In relation to the modular theory, the mind and its evolutionary origin, it would

seem to make sense to expect that

similar modules exist across reasonably related species.

Is there any research to support that?

well, my dogs have been barking at the mailman.

Module, eating module and so on.

And they also, but more seriously, they

must have some source of status related equipment.

There, there is clearly a hierarchy.

You saw that Frasier had the choice spot there in the chair.

That's the way the world works, and Milo accepts that.

Although, Milo does challenge Frasier sometimes to kind of semi-playful fights.

In what maybe an attempt to unseat him, but Frasier

usually handles them with with, with kind of successful nonchalance.

[NOISE] I want to get back actually, in a more serious

way, to this question about animals and modules.

But first, I want to say a bunch

of other stuff about modules, because there was much

talk of modules amongst students in the forum

and on Facebook, and on Twitter and so on.

So, for example, Rui Gil, R-U-I, Gil G-I-L, wrote in the discussion

forum, the videos from this week's lectures have put me in a state of dukkha.

To quote the great Buddhist Mick Jagger, they didn't get me no satisfaction.

He says I felt the explanatory power

of the theory of modules a little unsatisfactory.

Now at first I felt kind of guilty about, about feeling Rui with, dukkha.

But then I remembered, A, Dukkha is a pervasive part of life.

So, you know?

Don't blame me.

B, the source, ultimately, according to the four noble

truths of Rui's dukkha is actually his thirst for knowledge.

So Rui, if you would just surrender your thirst for knowledge, abandon

the thirst for knowledge, you will not be unsatisfied with anything I say.

And ironically, you will attain enlightenment.

No, but seriously, I owe Rui an answer.

Rui's not the only one in the discussion forum

who has doubts about the modular view of the mind.

So and I'm going to tackle a series of

such challenges to the modular view of the mind.

But first, let me talk about a couple of comments about the modular view of the

mind that weren't challenges, as far as I

could tell, unless there's a subtext that I missed.

And maybe there was.

[LAUGH] Actually.

Paula Duvalle wrote, in the discussion forum, she, she started

a thread titled, what mental module wrote your discussion post?

And yeah.

Come to think of it, that could be kind of

like, a little, a little subtle ridicule of the model, right?

But I don't think so.

I think it was.

I think it was,

I think she comes in peace.

She writes just asking myself and you it's

fascinating to think about it is fascinating to think.

But I mean the first thing I would say is there must be, when your posting

in the comment in the discussion forum, there

must be a module play that we didn't even

talk about, which is like a language generation

module right, the you know, these kind of,

some of these, a lot of these strictly

cognitive modules we didn't, we didn't talk much about.

There's got to be that.

But then there's the question, what do you say with your language module?

What do you express in the discussion forum?

And here I think we do get to some of those kinds of modules that were

laid out, and the one module theory that we kind of used as a modular theory.

The one the Seven Sub Cells posited by Doug Kendrick and

his co author, and in fact Paula elicited a reply that drew on that model,

Jennifer Hawkinds replied to Paula saying my guess it either affiliation or status.

Either the affiliation module or the

status module, By participating, you know in

the discussion forum, you get a little

happiness spike associated with any social interaction.

She said the forums also give people a

chance to show off, in quotes, what they know.

That's true, I think either of those modules could get triggered

in the discussion forum, and it's actually an example of the

point of this particular model which is that information comes in,

into the environment, and, and kind of determines which module gets triggered.

In this case it would depend on what your post you are reading says

right I mean, if you see a post that's, that, that agrees with your

view and even endorses your view expressed in the forum then you are like oh, an

ally, you're going to say nice things that's yeah it's all about affiliations.

On the other hand if someone, challenges and even especially if they belittle

something you have said on the forum, well that's a threat to your status right.

And that elicits a whole different way of conceiving of a

person who wrote the post, and a whole different kind of response.

because then you've gotta figure out a way

to undermine their credibility and restore your credibility.

Right?

And I don't mean you consciously think this.

That's the interesting thing about modules, right?

It works so much more subtly than that.

It's like someone challenges you, and, and you know, yeah, if you pay

attention, you can feel the kind

of antagonistic feeling that's welling up but,

what you may not realize is that then you immediately start looking at

their, their argument you know, for holes that you can exploit in replying right.

They must be wrong in challenging me.

They must be wrong whereas, this person it, the other person who

endorsed your views, you know, you're probably not going to be so picky, right?

Like he may read, why is there endorsing your views.

And if you think they got some things wrong, well hey, that's forgivable, right?

and, and I mean, we don't necessarily think about this, but that is the way.

That's just a good example of how triggering one module

or another, like steers your subsequent kind of cognitive activity, right?

Are you or are you not going to really assiduously analyze this person's argument

for a logical flaw and then convince

yourself that it's a fatal logical flaw, right?

Okay,

I also want to say though, you know, that said, that

I think this in a way bears out the module of the

mind, it's also true as I said I think in the lecture,

that things like this affiliation module status, module, they interact so fluidly.

Right, like so for example, somebody could endorse your view,

but they do it kind of in a patronizing way.

And so it's kind of like wait do they think, like, they're better than me?

I mean, if they think their status is higher than.

I mean, this is a tricky situation.

Right?

And.

And.

And.

And in general the interaction between, you

know, kind of status maintenance stuff and affiliation

stuff is so kind of fluid that, you know, sometimes I think, you know, module.

It's an unfortunate word because it give, it, it, it, it,

it does convey this idea that these are like, you know,

blocks, you know and like, where's the whole, the real thing

is much more fluid and continuous and so on, but anyway.

That said, now let's get to all

those posts that were a threat to my status, right?

I mean, these have to be dealt with.

People like Rui, who doubted a modular theory

of the mind that I think pretty highly of.

And again you know the, the, the one

we tried it out was just a conversation starter.

I, I don't, I don't like I'm not

endorsing the particular seven sub-cells or anything you

know, as I said it's going to be super complicated if we ever get to the

bottom in this but some version of modular theory in the mind I have high hopes for,

so it is a profound and great threat to my status when students doubt it.

And so, my status module, you know, read that Rui's post, other

posts, and like, it's like, what are we going to do about this?

And here's the plan that my status module came up with, see what you think of this.

Or actually, strictly speaking it's, well, I don't know, did my status module like

steer some cognitive module in a direction and then turn the job over it.

I don't know.

That's what I mean about how complicated this is.

Anyway, here's the plan.

I'm not going to argue that these people are wrong.

I'm just going to argue, that the models of

the mind that they are positing as alternatives to

the modular theory of the mind are not in

fact incompatible with a modular theory of the mind.

Okay.

So that way, this is my status module thinking now, that way

I can restore my status

without undermining their status and then they'll you know, then they'll be happy.

It won't you know, there will be no round of counter

attacks presumably, but let's see if this works, you be the judge.

Okay, let's start with Margo Warner, who said on Facebook, why

can't we just convert the notion of modules into something simpler?

Say that the brain has various parts which function in different ways.

Margo this may not surprise you given the preamble I just did but,

I don't think that's compatible, incompatible

with a modular view of the mind.

The modular view of the mind does say that

the brain has various parts which function in different ways.

But that alone could imply a number of

alternative models, of which the modular view that I trotted out is only one.

So, for example, what you've said here, various parts function in different ways.

That could be a very top down CEO diagram, right?

Like an actual corporation with the CEO, that's a conscious mind.

It's always consciously allocates tasks

to the different functionally specialized modules.

That would be one kind of model consistent with what

you've said, but I think the modular view is another kind.

It does say that the brain has various parts which function in

different ways, but it says it's a more kind of decentralized system

I, I want to make sure that I'm in

focus when I restore my status to its rightful place.

Okay, I think I'm focused now.

Where was I?

[BLANK_AUDIO]

Oh.

Modular view is kind of, the, it, it.

The key things are.

It's.

It's decentralized, and in the sense that the, the the, the determination of which

module is kind of running the show

for a while is not generally consciously determined.

Okay?

Okay.

Now onto Chriss, that's two s's, Pagani, who wrote, I believe on Facebook.

The modular,

the modular view is interesting, but couldn't

the examples given, be better explained by nuero-biology?

Now first of all, I want to emphasize, the module, any

modular view of the mind, we assume, will some day be explained neuro-biologically,

it's not an alternative to a neurobiological model.

So, Chriss we're on the same page.

We both, we both assume that the explanation

is going to be at the neurobilogical level.

Now Chriss goes on to say, in example such

as the person coming into you with a machete, stimulus

from the visual sense activates the limbic system that's

associated with like, you know, feelings and, and, and stuff.

Which activates fight or flight response and so

on, all very explicable through these well known processes

with very specific specialized portions of the brain, without

adding a layer of modules on top of them.

Okay, so there's maybe the, the thing.

We're not laying modules on top of the known physiology of the brain.

We're saying that a given module consists of a particular

way of orchestrating these known parts of the brain for

a specific task and any given part of the brain

may be orchestrate, may, may be involved in a number of different modules, right?

So

a kind of example is you know, the, you mentioned fight or flight.

And, and Milo is fleeing right now.

I don't know if you can see him, but that was Milo.

Milo is fleeing.

Milo's not really buying the the modular model of the mind apparently.

He's had enough.

Frasier, Frasier is his usual responsive self.

Hi, Frasier.

They may sense a threat downstairs.

But it's Sunday so it's not, it's not, the mailman.

[BLANK_AUDIO]

So, but I want to emphasize that, well I

think it's illuminating to look at this particular example.

Okay.

So how about we just say limbic system, fight or flight response.

We knew about that stuff.

fine.

right.

Those could be involved in what Kenrick calls the self

protection module, but I want to emphasize that Kenrick is

talking about self protection from humans, and sometimes when you're

dealing with humans it's more complicated that fight or flight, right?

It's like, sometimes, okay they may be ready to kill you, but maybe if

you give them some money, they won't, or maybe if you apologize they won't.

So it's more that fight or flight, you,

you, you've, there may be you know, negotiation, talking.

That is going to mean that you're going to have to use the theory of mind module.

The theory of mind module, remember, the module that helps you infer what

people are thinking, try to figure out what's actually going on in their head.

So that's going to, so when the threat comes from

a human that may well get triggered and, and

I, we saw a brain scan of the theory of mind kind of network, or module in the,

in the last lecture, which is evidence that, yes,

we're talking about neurobiology, talking about physiology but you

may have noticed that even the theory of mind

module, was itself drawing on different parts of the brain.

So so anyway, yes.

It, it's neurobiological.

But, you know, and modules aren't like whole blocks that are being added

that I'm claiming are on top of the stuff we already knew about.

Modules consist in distinctive you know, patterns of

orchestrating different parts of the mind, and it's because

evolution is so thrifty, that a lot of these parts

of the brain are going to be used in more than one module.

So for example you know, oxytocin is a chemical

that we know bonds mothers to infants right after birth.

Oxytocin also is involved in cementing the bonds in a friendship apparently.

And in trust generally in a social context, well we know that maternity

Preceded the friendship, in our species by a long, long time, okay.

Friendship is reciprocal altruism.

Well that, that came along much more recently than, than maternity.

But when, and that would come under the general

heading of what can cause the affiliation module, presumably.

You know, friendship, reciprocal altruism, but it drew on preexisting stuff.

This oxitosin that has this, this effect it being modulated differently and so

on, but, but you know modules are, anyway I, maybe I've made my point.

Maybe I haven't.

Anyway next, on to Margorie Forbes, who said

in the discussion forum, I cannot see how we

got from delusions of ourselves, that was the title

of the first segment, I think, of that lecture.

To this rather obscure modular view of the mind.

She says

well, she mentions this alternative model of Daniel Dennett's.

Which is called the fame in the brain hypothesis.

I'm not that conversant with it.

He says, then it says that in our heads, there's a turmoil going on.

A turmoil going on, there's many different elements vying for attention.

Something always wins and the one's that win are the ones that we are conscious of.

Actually that sounds like a modular theory of the mind.

Certainly could be.

And, and, as he fleshed it out I might say well, that's a little different.

But, that's, modular minds.

The modular, the standard, the common modular models

of the mind imagine something like that going on.

Now, here, earlier, in Margorie's post, there's something

that may explain why she thinks Dan Dennett's theory's different.

She says no one knows what consciousness is

yet, but there are other hypotheses, other than

the modular view of the mind, that explain

the issues raised in the first segment more simply.

The first segment being about delusions about ourselves.

And therefore more consistently with the principle of lightness.

well, or she means Occam's Razer, she says.

I just want to be clear.

I'm not sure if she's presupposing this, but the modular view doesn't

purport to explain consciousness in, in some kind of metaphysical sense, right?

I mean, it doesn't mean to address the

most challenging question about consciousness like what is it?

Why does it exist?

I know Dennett thinks he has an explanation.

Just between you and me, he doesn't.

But he, I know that is on his agenda and maybe that's

why she saw, what actually sounds like a modular view of the mine.

As as different from modular view of the mind.

I don't know.

But in any event, I want to emphasize, this

in not about explaining consciousness in the philosophical sense.

It's not.

That's not what the modular view of the mind is for.

So some.

Another commenter I know said, well, why don't we

use complexity theory, which explains,

like, emerging properties like consciousness?

Something like.

We're not trying to explain consciousness here, we're trying to

explain, well we're trying to explain a lot of things.

One of them is given that the conscious mind seems not to have a

clear idea of what is actually going on, well what is actually going on?

You know, there is various ways can explain a system where the conscious

mind doesn't get the full picture, module model is one of those explanations.

Okay now we get back to Rui Gil, now here's my

chance for revenge, remember now Rui is the trouble maker here.

And so I'm going have to do

whatever is necessary, all, by any means necessary I will defend my status.

Rui, says he prefers rather than a modular view of the

mind, he would like us to adopt Gregory Bateson's thing.

[LAUGH] Okay, I think this is another

thing, Gregory Bateson's kind of view in mind.

I think this is another example.

Something that you know remember my general

agenda here take, take things that people

say are inconsistent with a module view in mind, argue that they are not.

I think this is, I think Bateson is not.

Now I, I read the book Mind and Nature

oh literally 33 years ago, I have almost no recollection.

But I think, both by perusing quickly Rudy's recapitulation

of Bateson and based also on my memory of it.

You know, I just remember Bateson

emphasizing the interaction between us and other

organisms in the world generally.

The, the, the, the feedback loops of information being so pervasive that,

that you kind of have to think of it as a whole system.

And by the way that's actually a very Buddhist way to think of it.

But you can think of a modular view of the mind that way.

You can think of any, any model of the mind that way, I think.

It, it's just a it, it's you, you can take any account of what's going on in the

mind internally, I think, and plug it into Bateson's

view that there's this larger cybernetic system we're part of.

But maybe I'm wrong.

I may be straining here to hold up my status and I may fail.

okay, so enough of things that purport to be alternatives, but I think aren't.

Doug Karo mentions, Marvin Minsky's book, Society

of Mind, and, and, and Doug says, this

is on the discussion forum, says from

my faulty, in parentheses, memory of the material.

I suspect it's a higher level of abstract.

It's.

I suspect it's higher level of abstraction will be a more useful model than modules.

But there may be very little difference between the two.

I think the latter.

I think there's very.

I think Minski's model is an example of a modular view.

It's a very good, entertaining book, by the way.

There's, like, no chapter longer than about a page, you know?

It's just, it's a big, it's almost like a coffee table book

and worth tracking down, Minski was very smart, but I know that

Rob Kurzban who showed up in, in a couple

of lectures in his course of primary proponent of the modular view of the mind.

Was a student of [UNKNOWN] who's another primary

proponent, is a big fan of this book.

So Rob thinks it's like totally modular.

The book itself is actually modular in structure, but that's.

Speaking of other thinkers who may or may not be related to this.

Wu Suan asks I wanted to ask if the Bundle Theory, the mind from

Hume directly affected the development of the modular ideal mind.

I don't know the Bundle Theory of the mind very well.

I do know that Hume,

is a fascinating thinker of course you know, Scottish enlightenment philosopher.

A very Buddhist he has an argument against the existence of the self

that is structurally very much like the Buddhist argument against the self so much

so that scholars have speculated, on

whether he actually encountered Buddhist thought via

his encounters with Jesuits who had been to, China or something, somewhere in Asia.

Hume's worth.

It's really seen a number of ways.

I mean without being explicitly oblivious but the nature of his world view.

So you know, I, I again want to emphasize on modules.

The, the [UNKNOWN] model just a conversation starter.

You know, I think when we get to the bottom

of, of modules it's all going to be pretty darn complicated.

And you know, at some level you know, I think

the term module has to be an oversimplification in a way.

But that's almost, you know, I think a,a good Buddhist would say

that's true of lots of things you say about the world, right?

That ultimately these things we think about as things are all kind of processes.

There's, there, it's like all very fluid.

We put these, we use these nouns.

But everything is a process in flux.

I think there's some truth to that.

And I, and I think, you know, the

point where, like you take status, and affiliation.

It's like, you know, the point where one hands the

ball off, hands the torch off to the other one.

It's like, is it, you know, is it so clear always.

Or is it more like, you know, thinking of like

kind of networks that, you know, kind of move around.

Networks of activation that move around, and

sometimes merge, and sometimes are kind of semi-merged.

I don't know, I think the key thing for our purposes, or one

key thing, is that this is a model

where things in the environment, often in the environment.

Although, as we'll see in the lecture, we haven't already seen.

I think it's going to be posted this Thursday.

There is other ways modules can get

activated, but anyway, we shift from module

to module without consciously deciding to do it, we shift from emphasis to emphasis,

oh I'm in friend making mode now ,I'm evaluating this person as a friend,

I'm giving them the benefit of the doubt to like enemy mode to various modes.

Often without really thinking about it, it

fundamentally alters our view of reality and I

would argue that, just, you know, it's very

rare that actually we're seeing the true view.

We're always coloring the view in one way or another.

It kind of happens unconsciously without our awareness,

and in this lecture that's going to be posted

on Thursday we will get into the get

more into a connection between mindfulness meditation and this.

How mindfulness meditation relates to, to all this.

I think there's a few more things I wanted to get into but since

I don't see the questions right here, I think I should turn off camera.

I'll be right back.

Okay, I wanted to get back to this question from Kirsten Vivist about whether

there's evidence of modules in species closely related to us.

I'm not aware of much evidence of modules, per se.

However, I think it's interesting to look

at the behavioral parallels between humans and

chimpanzees, who are very closely related to us as closely related as any species.

You know, they chimps, they, they have what you might call friendship.

They have alliances, reciprocal altruism.

And they you know, they swap favors with their, their friends, their allies.

They also pursue status and, and that has great consequences and in fact the

alliances themselves, the coalitions are used in the pursuit of status.

So it's a pretty complex behavioral repertoire

with some apparent parallels with human behavior.

Now you know, and you would certainly, you would certainly assume that there's,

you know, some functional specialization in

the brain governing these, these behaviors, right?

I, I, I don't think these things are all

like cultural inventions on the part of chimpanzees, right.

Just invented the institution of friendship.

Now I want to emphasize, we are not descended

from chimpanzees, okay, these are not our ancestors.

Rather, we share, we both descended from a common ancestor and so do bonobos,

they are as closely related to us as chimpanzees and they are in some

ways different from chimpanzees and that's a

caution against inferring too much about what

this common ancestor of all three of us was like, we just don't know.

At the same time I do think if you

look at, at chimps, it's a pretty good guess that

You know, in our lineage, you know, whatever our

ancestors were like it's a pretty good guess that this

functional specialization in the brain governing things like friendship,

the pursuit of status, and the interaction between the two

probably started evolving quite a while before

we were capable of really complex reasoning.

Before we were capable of complex language, before we

were doing much in the way of conscious reflection.

And you know, that may help explain certain features about the relationship

of consciousness to the, the, the, the, to these modules.

And how much of the motivation is and is not conscious?

And so on.

But in any event I think it also illustrates that, you

know, just in a certain sense, I mean, modules, at least taken

broadly to mean functional specialization in the brain to coordinate certain kinds

of activities, also cannot help, you know, but have evolved, right.

I mean, it, it, it just, if you really take natural selection seriously, and you

realize that in our lineage we encountered different

challenges at different times and evolved responses to those challenges.

It's just kind of hard to imagine that

something like modules didn't, in some sense, kind

of, you know, pile up, which isn't to say that that, the theories we have been talk

about are, are you know exactly on target

or that we have figured out exactly you know,

how the modules are orchestrated or anything else,

but modules per se I think are a likely

outcome of evolution.

Margo Warner just quickly asks the theory of modules seems deterministic.

Does it leave any room for free will and responsibility for our actions.

Well I would just say briefly and cryptically, I would say it

leaves no more room and no less room, than other psychological theories.

I mean, psychological theories tend to be kind of deterministic on paper because

they you know, purport to come

up with mechanisms to explain things mechanistically.

But, you know, I to me it's just all a mystery.

I am agnostic on the question of free will and determinism.

I think the human mind is really incapable of grappling

successfully with that question and why would it be capable?

We didn't evolve to be philosophers, right?

I think there's a lot about there

are things we just may have trouble comprehending.

Consciousness may be another one and that may be related to free will.

Okay, another kind of free will-related thing.

Fritz Kreisler or Kreisler says, can't wait to hear how meditation

impacts the modular mind without choice, in quotes, entering into it.

Okay, so this is in anticipation of a lecture that will be, will air this week.

And it's a prescient anticipation because that choice does kind of come up.

I don't address it all that, that explicitly.

I mean, I don't, I don't address the free

will question all that explicitly, but it certainly is the

case that one thing this lecture's about is how we

can use meditation to influence which modules are in charge.

Fritz also says, I hope this course is the

core inspir, core or inspiration for your next book.

I actually am working on a book that's very much related to the course.

And that's one reason that you know, it's valuable to get all of this feedback.

You know, it, it, it can help me, you know,

rethink how to, how to frame things, how to explain things.

You know, am I explaining them successfully?

Sometimes it gets me to rethink the ideas themselves, you know?

Certainly in the case of this lecture, the feedback

has made me wish I'd emphasized more than I

did that, you know, the kind of seven sub-self

model that's in this one particular book I cited.

Mm, that's just a conversation starter.

I think it's a, it's a reasonable way to think about the taxonomy of modules.

In other words, in the realm of

affiliations, say, yeah, there must be some modules.

Whether that means there's an affiliation module per say, is another question.

You know, and so, it is all very complicated.

I try to emphasize that in the lecture, I want to reiterate it by way

of addressing the various, you know, valid forms

of skepticism about the model that have emerged.

So, thank you all.

For this thank you, Rui, who started it all off.

I'm sorry about your dukkah, Rui, but you know, that's life.

And [SOUND] I will see you [SOUND] next office hours about a week from now.

And also then, in this week's lecture.

Couple days from now.

A few days from now and believe it or not that's the second to last lecture.

So, you don't have long to wait until you attain nirvana.

See you next time.

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